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The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom
Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start
Prosecuting the Prosecutors?
Edward M. Genson *
and Marc W. Martin"
During the trial, the prosecutor referred to defense counsel as
"the defendant's mouthpiece" and told the jury that the defense
counsel's closing argument was a "lie. A bald face lie." After the
jury found the defendant guilty of murder, a death penalty hear-
ing began before the jury. There, the prosecutor conducted a
cross-examination in which he asked the defendant's psychiatric
witness, "Can the jurors take your condition into account, Doc-
tor?" The prosecutor also asked, "What is the oldest living pro-
fession in the world?" The witness responded, "I believe the
creation of chaos by Lawyers," to which, the prosecutor re-
sponded, "[o]r shrinks." The prosecutor went on to describe the
defendant's witness as "a member of the oldest profession known
to man," a "liar," and a "fraud." Following the heated cross-
examination, the witness approached the prosecutor and whis-
pered something in his ear. With the jury sitting in the box, the
prosecutor jumped up and repeated what the Illinois Supreme
Court described as an "obscene and disgusting epitaph," too des-
picable to be repeated in a reported opinion. When called before
the bar to explain his conduct, the prosecutor told the judge that
he wanted "to deck" the witness. The prosecutor also told the
judge that "[t]he man made a circus of this courtroom. He is a
whore and conducted himself as a whore." Later, the prosecutor
and defense counsel were called into chambers where the prose-
cutor referred to defense counsel as a "liar" and a "son of a
bitch." During another conference in chambers, the prosecutor
"took it upon himself to abruptly walk out ... and in the process
he made an obscene gesture at defense counsel."'
• Partner, Genson, Steinback & Gillespie, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1962, Northwest-
ern University; J.D. 1965, Northwestern University.
** Associate, Genson, Steinback & Gillespie, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1983, Loyola
University of Chicago; J.D. 1987, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. People v. Lyles, 106 Iil. 2d 373, 385-412, 478 N.E.2d 291, 295-308 (1985).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This episode transpired in a Cook County Courtroom.2 While
the conduct at issue above might be outlandish, it is yet another
example of improper prosecutorial conduct which often has oc-
curred in this state.3 Illinois courts have become alarmed at re-
peated instances ol prosecutorial misconduct Frustrated by the
reoccurrences of prosecutorial misconduct, the Illinois Appellate
Court has repeatedly asserted that such impropriety should be han-
dled in disciplinary proceedings regardless of whether it prompts
reversal.5 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has recom-
mended that, rather than reversing a defendant's conviction, a
court should address prosecutorial misconduct by instituting disci-
plinary proceedings or by chastising the guilty prosecutor through
identification in a published opinion.6
Notwithstanding the suggestions of the courts, Illinois discipli-
nary authorities rarely have instituted disciplinary proceedings
against prosecutors for courtroom misconduct. In fact, Illinois can
boast of only one published opinion, albeit an anomalous one at
best, pertaining to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in the
disciplinary context.7 As an alternative to formal disciplinary
measures, the Illinois Appellate Court has often reversed a defend-
ant's conviction as a sanction for improper and prejudicial
2. Id. at 382, 478 N.E.2d at 293.
3. The focus of this article shall be primarily on improper trial conduct. Instances of
forensic misconduct most often occur during closing argument. Improper prosecutorial
conduct however, has not been limited to summation and thus the terms "prosecutorial
misconduct" or "courtroom misconduct" used herein embrace improper statements
made by prosecutors during any facet of trial.
4. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 125 11. App. 3d 1077, 1080-81, 467 N.E.2d 291, 294-
95 (1st Dist. 1984). In Robinson, the court noted:
This court deals regularly with issues regarding improper and prejudicial
prosecutorial comments and the frequency with which such conduct occurs is
disturbing. Apparently, some prosecutors have not heeded the warnings of this
court and persist in engaging in whatever conduct they believe will assure con-
victions. However, the manner in which a case is tried is as important as the
outcome of the trial. Disparaging remarks and improper arguments only serve
to disgrace the attorney making the remarks, tarnish the reputation of the office,
and increase the possibility of reversal.
Id.
5. People v. Wilson, 123 I11. App. 3d 798, 806, 463 N.E.2d 890, 896 (1st Dist. 1984);
People v. Starks, 116 Ill. App. 3d 384, 396, 451 N.E.2d 1298, 1306-07 (1st Dist. 1983);
People v. Shepard, 114 Ill. App. 3d 598, 602, 449 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1st Dist. 1983).
6. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983); Imbler v. Patchtman, 424
U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
7. See In re Friedman, 76 Il. 2d 392, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979) (respondent discharged
for knowingly creating false evidence for purpose of exposing corrupt attorneys).
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prosecutorial conduct.' While reversal is necessary to protect the
defendant's rights, it fails to address the problem from a profes-
sional standpoint. Thus, it is time for the bar to refocus its position
on dealing with unethical prosecutors.
This article will examine the problem of prosecutorial miscon-
duct in Illinois. First, the various professional responsibility codifi-
cations which regulate prosecutorial conduct will be discussed.
Next, the article will note the boundaries of permissible and imper-
missible prosecutorial conduct as delineated by a multitude of Illi-
nois decisions. After examining how prosecutorial misconduct has
been handled outside the context of a direct appeal of a defendant's
conviction, the article will conclude by recommending new reme-
dies for this all too frequent problem.
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CODIFICATIONS AND THE
ASSESSMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The prosecutor's duty differs from that of the ordinary advocate
- his duty "is to seek justice, not merely convict." I As such, the
prosecutor owes a duty to the defendant as well as to the sover-
eign. 10 Accordingly, the prosecutor must avoid any conduct which
could impede the defendant's right to a fair trial. Improper
prosecutorial comments, however, do nothing but fly in the face of
the prosecutor's well-established responsibilities and frustrate the
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial trial."
The various codes of professional responsibility aptly put prose-
8. See infra notes 48-51, 54-58, 62-65, 67-70, 72-79, 81-83 and accompanying text.
9. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINSTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Stan-
dard 3-1.1(b) (1980). See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). In Berger,
Justice Sutherland provided the following often quoted statement:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful con-
viction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88.
10. People v. Oden, 20 I11. 2d 470, 483, 170 N.E.2d 582, 589 (1960). In Oden, the
court stated that a prosecutor "is a representative of all the people, including the defend-
ant, and it is as much his duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of the defendant as
those of any other citizen." Id.
1I. See, e.g., People v. Ray, 126 I11. App. 3d 656, 660, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (1st
Dist. 1984).
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cutors on notice of the permissible boundaries of conduct. 12 The
most comprehensive promulgations relating to prosecutorial court-
room conduct are the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Standards (the "Standards").13 In addition, the American Bar As-
sociation's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model
Rules") provide a source of ethical guidelines for the prosecutorial
advocate. 4 Finally, the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, modeled after the American Bar Association's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, provides binding ethical guidelines for
Illinois prosecutors. 5 Illinois has adopted neither the Model Rules
nor the Standards. Consequently, while these provisions may be
salutary, they are not specifically enforceable in Illinois discipli-
nary proceedings.
A. The Criminal Justice Standards
Part V of the Standards furnish guidelines for the prosecutor
during all stages of a criminal trial. 16 For example, Standard 3-5.2
governs behavior in the courtroom. This standard provides that a
prosecutor should support the dignity of the court by strictly ad-
hering to rules of decorum and maintaining a professional attitude
towards all participants in the courtroom. 17 It also instructs a
12. See generally CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rules 1-101 to -102,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, CANONS 1-101 to -102 (1985); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1984) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 1.1 (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].
13. See S. Schiller, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ILLINOIS COMPLIANCE ix (1980). The Standards
are not binding in Illinois. Id. at xiii. They are useful, however, in evaluating the ethical
duties of a prosecutor. Disciplinary tribunals may use them as a reference in examining
instances of misconduct. Moreover, a prosecutor's office is free to adopt the Standards as
a matter of internal office policy. Many jurisdictions have adopted the Standards.
MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at Rule 3.8 comment.
14. Like the Standards, the MODEL RULES are not binding in Illinois. The American
Bar Association has published two ethics codes, the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] and the MODEL RULES, supra note 12. The
MODEL CODE has been adopted in many states, including Illinois. CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES 1-101 to 9-102, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, CANONS 1-
101 to 9-102 (1985). In 1980, the American Bar Association promulgated the MODEL
RULES which purport to update the MODEL CODE.
15. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULE 1-101, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I 10A, CANON 1-101 (1985).
16. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at §§ 5.1 et seq. (1980).
17. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.2. This standard
provides:
(a) The prosecutor should support the authority of the court and the dignity of
the trial courtroom by strict adherence to the rules of decorum and by manifest-
[Vol. 19
1987] Prosecutorial Misconduct
prosecutor to address the court, rather than opposing counsel, and
prohibits any tactics designed to annoy the court or opposing coun-
sel.'" This standard further states that the prosecutor should be
punctual and comply with court orders.' 9
The boundaries in which the prosecutor must remain during
opening statements are set forth in Standard 3-5.5.20 According to
this standard, a prosecutor's opening statement should be confined
to a brief summary of the issues in the case and good faith remarks
about admissible evidence.2'
The presentation of evidence is governed by Standard 3-5.6.22
ing an attitude of professional respect toward the judge, opposing counsel, wit-
nesses, defendants, jurors, and others in the courtroom.
(b) When court is in session the prosecutor should address the court, not op-
posing counsel, on all matters relating to the case.
(c) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to engage in behavior or tactics
purposefully calculated to irritate or annoy the court or opposing counsel.
(d) A prosecutor should comply promptly with all orders and directives of the
court, but the prosecutor has a duty to have the record reflect adverse rulings or
judicial conduct which he considers prejudicial. The prosecutor has a right to
make respectful requests for reconsideration of adverse rulings.
(e) A prosecutor should be punctual in all court appearances and in the submis-
sion of all motions, briefs, and other papers.
(f) Prosecutors should cooperate with courts and the organized bar in develop-
ing codes of decorum and professional etiquette for each jurisdiction.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.5 (1980). This
standard provides:
The prosecutor's opening statement should be confined to a brief statement of
the issues in the case and to remarks on evidence the prosecutor intends to offer
which the prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible. It
is unprofessional conduct to allude to any evidence unless there is a good faith
and reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and ad-
mitted in evidence.
Id.
21. Id.
22. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.6. This standard
provides:
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly to offer false evi-
dence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses,
or fail to seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly and for the purpose
of bringing inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury to offer
inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable questions, or make other imper-
missible comments or arguments in the presence of the judge or jury.
(c) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to permit any tangible evi-
dence to be displayed in the view of the judge or jury which would tend to
prejudice fair consideration by the judge or jury until such time as a good faith
tender of such evidence is made.
(d) It is unprofessional conduct to tender tangible evidence in the view of the
Loyola University Law Journal
Under this standard, it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor
to offer knowingly false evidence or testimony, bring objectionable
or inadmissible matters to the attention of the judge or jury, dis-
play prejudicial tangible evidence to judge or jury prior to tender-
ing the evidence in good faith, or tender prejudicial tangible
evidence absent a reasonable basis for admissibility.23
Standard 3-5.7 delineates a prosecutor's ethical duties with re-
spect to the examination of witnesses.24 This standard states that
witnesses should be examined fairly, objectively and with respect
for their privacy.25 If the prosecutor knows that a witness is testi-
fying truthfully, then he should not use cross-examination to dis-
credit the witness. 6 If a prosecutor knows that a witness will
invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, then the prosecutor
should not call the witness and to do so may constitute unprofes-
sional conduct. 27 Furthermore, a prosecutor should not ask a ques-
tion for which a good faith factual predicate is lacking. 2
While closing arguments are a prolific source of instances of im-
proper prosecutorial conduct, 29 the guidelines for ethical behavior
in argument are relatively simple. A prosecutor may argue all rea-
judge or jury if it would tend to prejudice fair consideration by the judge or jury
unless there is a reasonable basis for its admission in evidence. When there is
any substantial doubt about the admissibility of such evidence it should be by an
offer of proof and a ruling obtained.
Id.
23. Id.
24. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.7. This standard
provides:
(a) The interrogation of all witnesses should be conducted fairly, objectively
and with due regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy of the witness, and
without seeking to intimidate or humiliate the witness unnecessarily. Proper
cross-examination can be conducted without violating rules of decorum.
(b) The prosecutor's belief that the witness is telling the truth does not neces-
sarily preclude cross-examination, but may affect the method and scope of
cross-examination. He should not misuse the power of cross-examination to
discredit or undermine a witness if he knows the witness is testifying truthfully.
(c) A prosecutor should not call a witness who he knows will claim a valid
privilege not to testify, for the purpose of impressing upon the jury the fact of
the claim of privilege. In some instances, as defined in the code of professional
responsibility, doing so will constitute unprofessional conduct.
(d) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to ask a question which im-
plies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith belief is lacking.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L.J. 505
(1975); Goodman, Crisis in ClosingArgument, 73 ILL. B.J. 120, (1985); Merrill, The Lir-
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sonable inferences from the record.3" It is considered unprofes-
sional conduct, however, to misstate evidence intentionally,
mislead the jury, express a personal belief or make "arguments cal-
culated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. ' 3 I Fur-
thermore, a prosecutor should not inject argument which will
divert the jury's attention from the issue of guilt or make predic-
tions about the consequences of the jury's verdict.32
Lastly, Standard 3-5.9 regulates a prosecutor's references to
matters outside the record. 33 This standard states that it is unpro-
fessional conduct for a prosecutor to refer to facts outside the rec-
ord except for matters subject to judicial notice.34
B. The Model Rules
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (the "Model Rules") also set forth special ethical stan-
dards for the prosecutorial advocate. Specifically, Model Rule 3.8
requires a prosecutor to: refrain from pursuing a criminal charge
absent probable cause; make reasonable efforts to assure the ac-
cused's right to counsel; abstain from securing a waiver of impor-
its of Prosecutorial Summation - An Overview of Permissible and Impermissible Final Ar-
guments, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 867 (1983).
30. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.8. This standard
provides:
(a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the
record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate
the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his personal belief
or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of
the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions
or prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than
the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.
(e) It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury
is kept within proper and acceptable bounds.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.9. This standard
provides:
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to refer to or argue
on the basis of facts outside the record whether at trial or on appeal, unless such
facts are matters of common public knowledge based on ordinary human expe-
rience or matters of which the court may take judicial notice.
Id.
34. Id.
1987]
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tant pretrial rights from an unrepresented defendant; disclose all
material which may exculpate the accused or be impeaching of a
government witness and other unprivileged mitigating information;
and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigative subordinates
from making prohibited extrajudicial statements." Although
Model Rule 3.8 does not govern trial conduct per se, other provi-
sions in the Model Rules do.36 In short, a prosecutor, like any
other litigator, must be candid toward a tribunal. 7 Furthermore,
the Model Rules mandate fairness to the opposing party and his
counsel. 3 Finally, conduct disruptive of the decorum of a tribunal
is prohibited.39
C. The Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
For rules of professional conduct that are enforceable in Illinois,
one must turn to the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, 4
modeled after the American Bar Association's Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Like the Model Rules and the Criminal
Justice Standards, the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
contains a provision specially pertaining to prosecutors. 4' This
provision, on its face, does not regulate trial conduct.42 It prohibits
a prosecutor from instituting charges unsupported by probable
cause. 43 It also requires timely disclosure of exculpatory or im-
peaching material or other mitigating information.44
35. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at Rule 3.8.
36. See MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at Rule 3.3.
37. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at Rule 3.4.
38. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, at Rule 3.5.
39. Id.
40. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-101, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, CANON 1-101 et seq. (1985).
41. Id. at CANON 7-103.
42. Id. Other rules promulgated under Canon 7, requiring zealous representation
within the bounds of the law, govern the courtroom conduct of ali attorneys as well other
ethical dilemmas which may arise in a prosecutor's practice. Id. at CANON 7-101 to -102
(delineating the boundaries of zealous representation); Id. at CANON 7-104 (regulating
communications with adverse witnesses); Id. at CANON 7-105 (specifically governing trial
conduct); Id. at CANON 7-107 (governing extrajudicial statements); Id. at CANON 7-108
(regulating attorney-juror communications); Id. at CANON 7-109 (forbidding suppression
of evidence and contingent payment of witnesses); Id. at CANON 7-110 (proscribing ex
parte communications and gifts and loans to judges or other court personnel).
43. Id. at CANON 7-103(a).
44. Id. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punish-
ment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1967). See also United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976). In addition, due process requires the government to disclose to the de-
fendant evidence that may impeach its witnesses or evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (plurality opinion).
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III. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Disciplinary sanctions are rarely imposed against prosecutors.45
Consequently, the question of whether a prosecutor's conduct is
unethical must be resolved by analyzing judicial treatment of
prosecutorial misconduct in appeals of criminal convictions. Be-
cause of the frequency of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in
state criminal cases and the scarcity of disciplinary cases against
prosecutors, it can be said that the common law dispenses a more
prolific source of practical ethical guideposts for prosecutors than
the professional responsibility codes. The categories of improper
prosecutorial trial conduct are quite vast. As noted by one com-
mentator, "[tihe list of possible errors . . . is limited only by the
imagination of trial lawyers." 46 Nonetheless, the varieties of im-
proper prosecutorial remarks which have culminated in reversible
error in Illinois are generally grouped below. 7
A. Attacking the Defense
Illinois prosecutors' verbal attacks directed at the defense have
often supplied grounds for reversal in Illinois. While it hardly
needs saying that a prosecutor should refrain from assailing the
defense, prosecutors continue to do so. Hence, many of the rever-
sals in Illinois cases occured when the prosecutor improperly
abused the accused, 4  denigrated the defendant's expert wit-
nesses, 49 verbally attacked defense counsel5  and pitted the reputa-
45. B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13-6 (1985); Alschuler, Court-
room Misconduct By Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 670 (1972). See
also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
46. Goodman, supra note 29, at 120.
47. Admittedly, the categories sometimes overlap. As a practical matter, it should be
noted that Illinois courts usually have not reversed for an isolated prejudicial
prosecutorial remark; reversal has been mandated only when repeated improper
prosecutorial comments appear in the record. See, e.g., People v. Weathers, 62 Ill. 2d
114, 118-20, 338 N.E.2d 880, 882-84 (1975); People v. Strange, 125 Ill. App. 3d 43, 47,
465 N.E.2d 616, 620 (Ist Dist. 1984).
48. People v. Weathers, 62 Ill. 2d 114, 118, 338 N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (1975) (although
the defendant had not been arrested previously, the prosecutor stated that he was a
"pretty smart cookie" who was too smart to get caught, but got caught this time); People
v. Sales, 151 I1. App. 3d 226, 231, 502 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Ist Dist. 1986) (absent an
evidentiary foundation, prosecutor argued that defendant's crime was motivated by ho-
mosexuality); People v. Strange, 125 I1. App. 3d 43, 46, 465 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1st Dist.
1984) (prosecutor called defendant a "liar" and stated that he wished the jury had a
"built-in shockproof B.S. detector"); People v. Scaggs, I1 111. App. 3d 633, 636, 444
N.E.2d 674, 676 (1st Dist. 1982) (prosecutor referred to defendant's sexual immorality).
49. People v. Lyles, 106 IIl. 2d 373, 398-414, 478 N.E.2d 291, 301-08 (1985) (during
the death penalty phase of a jury trial the prosecutor asked the defendant's expert witness
whether the jury could take his [the expert's] condition into account and stated that the
Loyola University Law Journal
tion and integrity of the prosecutor's office against that of the
defendant and his counsel."
B. Appeals to Improper Considerations
Criminal trials, with a man's liberty or life at stake, are highly
charged emotional affairs.52 Consequently, lawyers may be prone
to appeal to the jury's sympathies, prejudices, and emotions. Such
expert was a member of the "oldest profession known to man," that the expert was a
"whore," a "liar," and a "fraud"); People v. Thomas, 37 Il1. App. 3d 320, 327, 346
N.E.2d 190, 195 (3rd Dist. 1976) (in an obscenity prosecution, the prosecutor called the
defendant's expert witness a "nut" and sarcastically stated that the jury could "consider
psychiatrists in and of themselves [as having] done great service to the community. They
release murderers from institutions.") (emphasis in original).
50. People v. Bean, 109 Ill. 2d 80, 101, 485 N.E.2d 349, 359 (1985) (prosecutor sug-
gested that the defense attorney deliberately introduced reversible error into the record
and "without any basis for doing so, discredited [the defendant's] attorney"); People v.
Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 398-414, 478 N.E.2d 291, 301-08 (1985) (prosecutor referred to the
defense attorney as a "mouthpiece" during closing argument and told the jury the defense
counsel's closing argument was a "bald face lie"; in chambers, the prosecutor termed the
defense lawyer as a "liar" and a "son-of-a-bitch" and directed an obscene gesture at de-
fense counsel); People v. Weathers, 62 I1. 2d 114, 118-120, 338 N.E.2d 880, 882-84
(1975) (the prosecutor accused defense counsel of lying and stated that the defense attor-
ney knew that his client was guilty, but was attempting to create reasonable doubt by
confusion); People v. Beringer, 151 Ill. App. 3d 558, 562, 503 N.E.2d 778, 781 (1st Dist.
1987) (prosecutor accused defense counsel of deception); People v. Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d
656, 660, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Dist. 1984) (sixteen times, the prosecutor accused
defense counsel of lying; the prosecutor also stated that defense counsel was attempting to
"confuse" and "intimidate" the jury); People v. Clark, 114 Il. App. 3d 252, 253-56, 448
N.E.2d 926, 927-29 (1st Dist. 1983) (prosecutor repeatedly asserted that defense counsel
was playing "tricks," employing "sleight of hand," "dirtying the victim" and implied that
defense counsel was hiding evidence); People v. Brown, 113 Ill. App. 3d 625, 628-31, 447
N.E.2d 1011, 1013-15 (1st Dist. 1983) (prosecutor declared that defense counsel was a
"mouthpiece," a "slickster," a "liar," and "had unmitigated gall"); People v. Weinger,
101111. App. 3d 857, 868-71, 428 N.E.2d 924, 932-34 (1st Dist. 1981) (prosecutor implied
that defense counsel was preventing the state from eliciting evidence damaging to the
defendant and that defense counsel, a former law school professor, had taught his stu-
dents, one of whom testified at trial and was now disbarred, how to subvert a police
investigation); People v. Suggs, 50 111. App. 3d 778, 783, 365 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (1st Dist.
1977) (prosecutor admonished defense counsel to act like a lawyer, accused counsel of
perpetrating a lie, acting unethically and playing "tricks"); People v. Thomas, 37 Ill.
App. 3d 320, 327, 346 N.E.2d 190, 195 (3rd Dist. 1976) (prosecutor called defense coun-
sel a liar); People v. Weller, 123 I1. App. 2d 421, 427-28, 258 N.E.2d 806, 810 (4th Dist.
1970) (prosecutor stated that defense attorney could qualify as a "S.S. trooper"); People
v. Glickman, 27 I1. App. 2d 379, 384, 169 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1st Dist. 1960) (prosecutor
stated that defense attorney was seeking an acquittal for purely personal mercenary
reasons).
51. People v. Janes, 138 I11. App. 3d 558, 566, 486 N.E.2d 317, 324-25 (2d Dist. 1985)
(trial prosecutor testified on behalf of state's case).
52. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897); United States v. Wexler, 79
F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935).
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appeals are improper. 3 Although the prosecutor should be acutely
aware of his duty to remain fair and impartial and to refrain from
improper arguments, a litany of Illinois cases exist in which the
courts reversed because of improper prosecutorial appeals. The
courts have reversed when the prosecution improperly alluded to:
law and order ideals,5 4 the jurors as parents,5 and racial, socioeco-
nomic, or ethnic prejudices.5 6 In addition, the prosecution's know-
ing elicitation of inflammatory testimony57 and references to
victims or the impact of the defendant's crime upon the victim's
family5" have culminated in reversal.
C. References to the Defendant's Invocation of the Fifth
Amendment Right to Remain Silent
Under the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination as applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment,59 the state is prohibited from
drawing attention to the accused's failure to testify at trial.60 Simi-
53. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.8.
54. People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 469 N.E.2d 119 (1984).
55. Id. at 169, 171-72, 469 N.E.2d at 136, 138 (prosecutor related how he took his
seven-year-old son to see the death chair and compared the death penalty to a parent
justifiably using force to avenge an attack on a son or daughter).
56. People v. Romero, 36 I1. 2d 315, 319-20, 223 N.E.2d 121, 124 (1967) (prosecutor
appealed to the religious and social mores of the jury by noting that defendant had lived
with his girlfriend and had not married her); People v. Lurry, 77 Ill. App. 3d 108, 113-14,
395 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (3rd Dist. 1979) (prosecutor discussed black crimes, and the prob-
lem of black crimes in our society; he also called Detroit the "murder capital" of the
world where the black man has more of a chance of dying by murder as opposed to
accident and stated that he hoped that the jury did not want Joliet to become like De-
troit); People v. Blackman, 44 Ill. App. 3d 137, 140-41, 358 N.E.2d 50, 52-53 (1st Dist.
1976) (prosecutor told the jury that if they acquitted the defendant they better beat the
defendant back to their autos and that they better not frequent the defendant's
neighborhood).
57. People v. Whitlow, 89 Iil. 2d 322, 338-40, 433 N.E.2d 629, 636-37 (1982).
58. People v. Holman, 103 II!. 2d 133, 166-67, 469 N.E.2d 119,133 (1984); People v.
Ramirez, 98 111. 2d 439, 452-54, 457 N.E.2d 31, 37-39 (1983); People v. Littlejohn, 144
I11. App. 3d 813, 827, 494 N.E.2d 677, 686-87 (1st Dist. 1986).
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that it was a violation of due process
for the state to introduce victim impact statements during the death penalty phase of a
capital case. Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987); Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct.
2529 (1987).
59. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
60. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Griffin, the Court held that any
comment directing the jury's attention to the defendant's right not to testify violates the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 615. The state,
however, may properly argue that its case is unrebutted notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant would be the only person who could rebut it. People v. Mills, 40 III. 2d 4, 8,
237 N.E.2d 697, 700 (1968).
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larly, the state cannot impeach a defendant with his post-arrest si-
lence.61 Despite these bright line rules, Illinois prosecutors have
sometimes improperly commented on the defendant's silence. The
courts have reversed when a prosecutor has commented on the ac-
cused's failure to call witnesses,62 the accused's failure to testify,63
and the accused's post-arrest silence or failure to produce a defense
at an earlier date. 64
D. Misstating the Law
A prosecutor is charged with knowledge of the law, especially
the law applicable to the case on trial. Thus, a prosecutor's mis-
stating the law may be viewed as inexcusable, and such misstate-
ments have resulted in reversal. 65 Although our criminal justice
system presumes the defendant's innocence, gives the state the bur-
den of proving each and every element of a crime beyond a reason-
able doubt, and does not require the defendant to prove anything
in his defense,66 most reversals in the misstatement of law area
have been ordered because the prosecution misstated rudimentary
due process considerations relative to the burden of proof. Specifi-
cally, reversal has been decreed where the prosecution has argued
that reasonable doubt merely is a formality, 67 diminished the pre-
61. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (state's use for impeachment of the defend-
ant's failure to tell an exculpatory story at the time of arrest violated the due process
clause).
62. People v. Scaggs, 111 111. App. 3d 633, 636-37, 444 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1st Dist.
1982) (prosecutor told the jury that a certain witness did not "show" because he would
not "lie" for the defendant); People v. Evans, 78 II1. App. 3d 996, 1000, 398 N.E.2d 326,
328-30 (3rd Dist. 1979) (prosecutor told the jury that the defendant's case was "not sup-
ported by any witnesses"). Notwithstanding the defendant's right to compulsory process,
the prosecution cannot comment on the defendant's failure to call a witness when a wit-
ness who did not testify at trial was equally available to the state and the defendant. See,
e.g., People v. Holman, 103 Iil. 2d 133, 151, 469 N.E.2d 119, 128 (1984).
63. Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 664-66 (7th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's indirect
reference to defendant's failure to testify); People v. Ramirez, 98 I11. 2d 439, 451, 457
N.E.2d 31, 37 (1983) (during the death penalty phase in a jury trial, the prosecutor stated
that the defendant had "sat silent" before his accusers and the trier of fact and had failed
to offer an explanation for the murder).
64. See People v. Stack, 112 II1. 2d 301, 304-07, 493 N.E.2d 339, 341-42 (1st Dist.
1986); People v. Suggs, 50 I11. App. 3d 778, 781-83, 365 N.E.2d 1118, 1120-21 (1st Dist.
1977); People v. Patterson, 44 Ill. App. 3d 894, 896-97, 358 N.E.2d 1164, 1166-68 (Ist
Dist. 1976).
65. People v. Estes, 127 III. App. 3d 642, 649, 469 N.E.2d 275, 281 (3rd Dist. 1984);
People v. Ray, 126 I11. App. 3d 656, 661, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (1st Dist. 1984); People
v. Eckhardt, 124 II!. App. 3d 1041, 1042-43, 465 N.E.2d 107, 109 (2nd Dist. 1984); Peo-
ple v. Scaggs, 111 111. App. 3d 633, 637, 444 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1st Dist. 1982); People v.
Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 122, 128, 429 N.E.2d 905, 910 (3rd Dist. 1981).
66. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
67. People v. Starks, 116 III. App. 3d 384, 394-95, 451 N.E.2d 1298, 1306 (1st Dist.
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sumption of innocence,68 attempted to shift the burden of proof,69
and defined reasonable doubt. 0
E. Referring to Matters Not in the Record
Again, it is elementary that a lawyer should not introduce
or make references to matters which are not in the record or factu-
ally supported or precluded per court order.71 Nonetheless, viola-
tions of the foregoing ideal have been a prolific source for reversal.
For instance, Illinois courts have reversed because the prosecution
asked questions without a factual basis, 72 defied motions in
limine, 7 failed to support its opening statement with evidence,74
1983) (prosecutor argued that the burden of proof in this case was the same burden as
that in thousands of cases across the country, was no different from any other case and
that the defendant did not stand on a pedestal); People v. Scaggs, 111 111. App. 3d 633,
637, 444 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1st Dist. 1982) (prosecutor asserted that every defendant who
has ever been convicted had been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that rea-
sonable doubt was "not some impossible thing floating up there in the air. It is a burden
that is met every day."); People v. Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 122, 125, 429 N.E.2d 905,
908, 910 (3rd Dist. 1981) (prosecutor stated that burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt applied in every criminal case in the history of the United States, that the burden
was met every day and was not beyond reach).
68. People v. Thomas, 146 Ii. App. 3d 1087, 1089, 497 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1986)
(court concluded that prosecutor's closing remark that a defense witness had "trumped
up" her story and that there was "nobody here for the People, just you" diminished the
presumption of innocence).
69. People v. Harbold, 124 II1. App. 3d 363, 371-72, 464 N.E.2d 734, 741-42 (1st
Dist. 1984) (prosecutor repeatedly argued that there was no proof that the defendant was
not guilty, thus implying that the defendant was required to prove his innocence); People
v. Giangrande, 101 Il1. App. 3d 397, 402, 428 N.E.2d 503, 507 (1st Dist. 1981) (during
closing argument, prosecutor exhorted, "[W]here's the evidence that the defendant didn't
do it?").
70. See People v. Jenkins, 89 Ill. App. 3d 395, 398, 411 N.E.2d 1047, 1048-49 (1st
Dist. 1980). See also People v. Faysom, 131 I11. App. 3d 517, 524, 475 N.E.2d 945, 951
(1st Dist. 1985) (prosecutor defining reasonable doubt held to be harmless error); People
v. Garcia, 103 I11. App. 3d 779, 784-85, 431 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (1st Dist. 1981) (same).
A prosecutor should refrain from defining reasonable doubt because there is no better
definition of reasonable doubt than the words themselves. Jenkins, 89 I11. App. 3d at 398,
411 N.E.2d at 104849.
71. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at §§ 3-5.6. to 3-5.9
(1980).
72. People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill. 2d 375, 381, 213 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1969) (state failed to
perfect impeachment and asked questions absent an evidentiary basis); People v. Ber-
inger, 151 I11. App. 3d 558, 560-61, 503 N.E.2d 778, 780 (1st Dist. 1987) (prosecutor
asked questions absent an evidentiary foundation); People v. Strange, 125 I11. App. 3d 43,
47, 465 N.E.2d 616, 620 (1st Dist. 1984) (prosecutor improperly suggested that defendant
had used an alias); People v. Giangrande, 101 Ill. App. 3d 397, 405, 428 N.E.2d 503, 509
(1st Dist. 1981) (prosecutor insinuated that main defense witness had not gotten along
with her mother).
73. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 496-97, 455 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (1983) (after trial
court barred prosecution from mentioning fact that defendant was carrying a revolver on
his person at the time of his arrest and defense counsel argued that his client had not
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and misstated the facts." In addition, more culpable instances of
misconduct can be found in the cases. Many convictions have been
reversed because the prosecutor suggested that the defendant man-
ufactured a defense or was attempting to escape a guilty verdict by
trickery, intimidation, or by hiding behind constitutional rights, 76
insinuated that the prosecution had evidence available but could
not use it because of defense objections,77 referred to the accused's
other crimes, 7 and suggested that witnesses were afraid to testify
acted like a guilty person when he was arrested, the prosecutor told the jury that he could
not tell everything that the defendant had done subsequent to his arrest); People v. Whit-
low, 89 I11. 2d 322, 340-41, 433 N.E.2d 629, 637 (1982) (despite fact that trial court had
granted defendants' motions in limine seeking to exclude any reference of past criminal
activity of unrelated pending charges, prosecutor "made questionable reference to "de-
fendants' backgrounds" during rebuttal argument); People v. Sales, 151 Ill. App. 3d 226,
233, 502 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (1st Dist. 1987) (although court, on state's motion, had pre-
cluded defense from arguing that the crime was racially motivated, the state did so);
People v. Campbell, 115 111. App. 3d 631, 634-38, 450 N.E.2d 1318, 1321-22 (1st Dist.
1983) (prosecutor, in express defiance of the trial court's order and the rule of Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), repeatedly informed the jury that the defendant's
accomplice had implicated the defendant).
74. People v. Whitlow, 89 II1. 2d 329, 337-38, 433 N.E.2d at 636 (1982); People v.
Weinger, 101 Iil. App. 3d 857, 866-67, 428 N.E.2d 924, 934 (1st Dist. 1981).
75. People v. Linscott, 159 II1. App. 3d 71, 511 N.E.2d 1303 (1st Dist. 1987); People
v. Giangrande, 101 I11. App. 3d 397, 428 N.E.2d 503 (1st Dist. 1981).
76. People v. Emerson, 97 I11. 2d 487, 497, 455 N.E.2d 41, 45 (1983) (prosecutor
suggested during closing argument that defense had "laid down a smokescreen 'com-
posed of lies and misrepresentations and innuendoes'" and that all defense attorneys
attempt to discredit the victim so as to distract the jury from the defendant's crime);
People v. Weathers, 62 Ill. 2d 114, 118-121, 338 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1975) (during closing
argument, prosecutor stated that defense attempted to create "confusion, indecision and
misrepresentation"); People v. Stock, 56 I11. 2d 461, 468-73, 309 N.E.2d 19, 23-25 (1974)
(prosecutor suggested that defendant was attempting to win acquittal through trickery);
People v. Ray, 126 Il1. App. 3d 656, 662-63, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (1st Dist. 1984)
(prosecutor argued that defendant was hiding behind his rights and stated that "[i]t's
about time the Constitution that this man is hiding behind is put in back of him"); People
v. Clark, 114 111. App. 3d 252, 253-56, 448 N.E.2d 926, 928-29 (1st Dist. 1983) (prosecu-
tor implied that defendant was hiding evidence and that he was trying to escape convic-
tion by trickery); People v. Witted, 79 Ill. App. 3d 156, 167-68, 398 N.E.2d 68, 76-78 (1st
Dist. 1979) (prosecutor accused defense of hiding behind "technicalities in the law,"
urged the jury not to let defendant sell them a "bad bill of goods").
77. Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 661, 467 N.E.2d at 1082 (prosecutor told jury that he
wished he could show them his file but that he could not because of the law that the
defendant was hiding behind); People v. Weinger, 101 I11. App. 3d 857, 871, 428 N.E.2d
924, 934 (1st Dist. 1981) (on twenty occasions, prosecutor asked questions after the trial
court had already sustained the defendant's objection to the question; the appellate court
concluded that this was a tactic designed to cast the defense attorneys as obstructionists);
People v. Lopez, 89 I11. App. 3d 456, 457, 411 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (1st Dist. 1980) (during
closing argument, the prosecutor stated that although the state had evidence to back up
its inferences, defense counsel had prevented the evidence from being admitted).
78. People v. Whitlow, 89 I1. 2d 322, 340-41, 433 N.E.2d 629, 637 (1982); People v.
Ray, 126 III. App. 3d 656, 662, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (1st Dist. 1984); People v. Dace,
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because the defendant has threatened them.79
F. Stepping Outside of a Professional Role
An attorney should not interject his personal opinions into a
case. s0 This proscription is especially relevant in a criminal case
tried before a jury because the jurors tend to view the prosecutor as
their representative and as having superior knowledge of the facts
of the case and the criminal justice system. Consequently, it is im-
perative that the prosecutor present the appearance of objectivity.
Notwithstanding those clear proscriptions, Illinois prosecutors
have caused reversal by assuming personal responsibility if the
death penalty is imposed,8' expressing personal opinions about the
defendant's guilt and the credibility of witnesses,8 2 and making per-
sonal predictions of the consequences of the verdict or failure to
render the death penalty. 3
G. Ramifications of the Reversal Remedy
The foregoing classifications are not exhaustive.8 4 They do not
114 I11. App. 3d 908, 920, 449 N.E.2d 1031, 1038 (3rd Dist. 1983); People v. Patterson,
44 111. App. 3d 894, 899-900, 358 N.E.2d 1164, 1168-69 (1st Dist. 1976).
79. People v. Ray, 126 I11. App. 3d at 656, 467 N.E.2d at 1081-82; People v. Dace,
114 I11. App. 3d 908, 92C, 449 N.E.2d 1031, 1038 (3rd Dist. 1983); People v. Brown, 113
I1l. App. 3d 625, 627-30, 447 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (1st Dist. 1983).
80. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 12, at § 3-5.9.
81. People v. Yates, 98 I11. 2d 502, 536-38, 456 N.E.2d 1369, 1386-87 (1983) (during
rebuttal closing argument in the death penalty phase of a jury trial, the prosecutor stated
that jury should condemn the defendant to death because there was no doubt that he had
committed the crime at issue and that if somebody later came forward and admitted to
the defendant's crime the jury could blame the prosecutor and the prosecutor would take
"all the responsibility" if the defendant was unjustifiably convicted).
82. People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 341,433 N.E.2d 629, 637-38 (1982) (prosecutor
expressed personal belief of defendant's guilt and based this belief on grounds which not
in evidence); People v. Monroe, 66 11. 2d 317, 323-24, 362 N.E.2d 295, 298 (1977) (pros-
ecutor stated that defense was "preposterous" and has never heard a "weaker defense in
five years of practicing in criminal law"); People v. Turner, 127 I11. App. 3d 784, 792, 469
N.E.2d 368, 374 (1st Dist. 1984) ("A prosecutor's statements implying that charges
would not have been placed against the defendant unless the prosecutor thought he was
guilty are improper and prejudicial error."); People v. Clark, 114 I11. App. 3d 252, 256,
448 N.E.2d 926, 929 (1st Dist. 1983) (prosecutor improperly stated that he "believe[d]
that this case [was] overwhelming").
83. People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 411, 478 N.E.2d 291, 306-07 (1985) (prosecutor
stated that defendant would be released on parole in eight years if jury did not condemn
defendant to death); People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 161-63, 469 N.E.2d 119, 134-53
(1984) (prosecutor predicted that defendant would commit other crimes if not executed);
People v. Szabo, 94 Ii. 2d 327, 366-67, 447 N.E.2d 193, 212 (1983) (prosecutor inprop-
erly speculated that defendant might be paroled if not sentenced to death); People v.
Walker, 91 111. 2d 502, 515, 440 N.E.2d 83, 88 (1982) (same).
84. For other categorizations of improper prosecutorial remarks, see Balske,
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note every Illinois case in which prosecutorial misconduct resulted
in reversal.85 Nor do they note the litany of cases in which the
court found that improper prosecutorial conduct constituted harm-
less error.8" Nor does the categorization reveal instances in which
the appellate court determined that the issue of prosecutorial mis-
conduct had been waived.87 Finally, the foregoing list does not
mention cases in which the prosecutorial misconduct did not
amount to reversible error because of the invited response
doctrine.88
Hopefully, the above categorization illustrates the sheer magni-
tude of the problem. It is realized that the stakes are high in a
criminal trial, resulting in sometimes excusable displays of emo-
tion.89 In most instances, however, the prosecutor simply has no
excuse for committing the forms of misconduct noted in the cases.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, the case law, and com-
mon sense supply the prosecutor with ample notice of what is per-
missible and what is not. Nonetheless, despite rebukes from the
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument: the Arts of Knowing When and How
to Object and of Avoiding the 'Invited Response' Doctrine, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1033,
1034-56 (1986); Merrill, supra note 29, at 868-78 (1983); Crump, supra note 29, at 509-
31.
85. For a listing of additional Illinois cases in which prosecutorial misconduct caused
reversal, see Chicago Lawyer, August, 1987, at 23.
86. See, e.g., People v. Alexander, 127 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1014, 470 N.E.2d 1071,
1077 (1st Dist. 1984) (prosecutor declared to the jury that the defendant was an "animal"
and a "beast"); People v. Robinson, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081, 467 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1st
Dist. 1984) (prosecutor told jury that the defendant's attorney spoke with a "forked
tongue," was using tricks "to beat this rap" and was a "pretty dirty trial lawyer" for such
a small woman); People v. Wilson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 798, 804, 463 N.E.2d 890, 894 (1st
Dist. 1984) (prosecutor accused defendant and his lawyer of lying and not wanting the
jury to hear the truth); People v. Shepard, 114 I1. App. 3d 598, 602, 449 N.E.2d 222, 225
(1st Dist. 1983) (prosecutor asserted that the defense attorney was attempting to free an
''animal").
87. See, e.g., People v. Buckner, 121 Ill. App. 3d 391, 396-97, 459 N.E.2d 1102, 1107
(1st Dist. 1984). To preserve the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, defense counsel must
make a contemporaneous objection and then raise the issue in post-trial motions. Despite
the frequent failure to follow these procedural steps, Illinois courts may nonetheless re-
view issues of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error. See, e.g., People v. Whitlow, 89
Ill. 2d 322, 341-42, 433 N.E.2d 629, 638 (1982); People v. Strange, 125 Ill. App. 3d 43,
46, 465 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1st Dist. 1984). Cf United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16
(1985) (in order to reverse under the plain error standard, the prosecutor's improper
remarks must "undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a mis-
carriage of justice").
88. For an in depth discussion of the invited response doctrine, see generally Balske,
supra note 84, at 1056-60. See also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1985).
89. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897); United States v. Wexler, 79
F.2d 526 (2nd Cir. 1935). In Wexler, Judge Learned Hand remarked, "It is impossible to
expect that a criminal trial shall be conducted without some show of feeling; the stakes
are high, and the participants are inevitably charged with emotion." Id. at 530.
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bench and bar, misconduct continues to occur, with no end being
in sight. As a result, judicial and prosecutorial resources are being
wasted, the public's confidence in the criminal justice system is be-
ing diminished, and the rights of the accused are being ignored and
trampled.
Some view the current remedy of reversing a conviction because
of prosecutorial misconduct as being insufficient. 90 The standards
for determining whether misconduct warrants reversal are much
too subjective. 91 Thus, a lack of consistency exists among the
cases, and verdicts will not be reversed with predictability when
prosecutorial misconduct is found.92 Despite these deficiencies, it
is not suggested that the reversal remedy should be abandoned.
Reversal still serves a salutary punitive purpose in light of grossly
uncalled for and unexcusable prosecutorial conduct.93 Moreover,
when the prosecutor impedes the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the defendant's interest in receiving a trial untainted by
prosecutorial misconduct obviously outweighs any countervailing
concerns.
90. See, e.g., Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors - and How It Grew,
20 ALA. L. REV. 227, 237 (1968); Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political
Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 487 (1959); Note, Misconduct of Judges and Attorneys During
Trial: Informal Sanctions, 49 IowA L. REV. 531, 543 (1964). From the prosecutorial
perspective it might be argued that reversal is insufficient because it gives a defendant an
unnecessary windfall when there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.
91. Illinois courts have articulated various tests to determine whether improper
prosecutorial remarks warrant reversal. For example, a defendant's conviction will be
reversed when the remarks constitute a "material factor" in the defendant's conviction.
People v. Duckett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 443, 308 N.E.2d 590, 596 (1974). Similarly, some
courts have claimed that a conviction ordinarily should not be reversed for prosecutorial
remarks unless the remarks result in "substantial prejudice to the accused." People v.
Pittman, 93 Ill. 2d 169, 176, 442 N.E.2d 836, 839 (1982); People v. Giangrande, 101 II1.
App. 3d 397, 403, 428 N.E.2d 503, 508 (1st Dist. 1981). Courts have stated also that a
defendant's conviction will be reversed on the basis of a prosecutor's improper remarks
only if "the verdict would have been different had the objectionable remarks not been
made." E.g., People v. Hastings, 72 Ill. App. 3d 816, 824, 390 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (1979).
In a close case, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are more likely to tip the scales
toward reversal. People v. Johnson, 102 11. App. 3d 122, 129, 429 N.E.2d 905, 911 (3rd
Dist. 1981). See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
92. Alschuler, supra note 45, at 638; Goodman, supra note 29, at 120. Professor
Alschuler noted:
The sense that most clearly emerges from the decisions is that of unpredict-
ability. Cases proceed on an ad hoc basis, and results do not follow a consistent
pattern. Even if the alleged misconduct in one case seems similar to the alleged
misconduct in another, the procedural context is invariably different. The force
of precedent is therefore slight. The courts seem to enjoy an almost total free-
dom to reach any result on any given set of facts.
Alschuler, supra note 45, at 638.
93. See Alschuler, supra note 45, at 646-47 (arguing that reversal is effective and
operates much like the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment jurisprudence).
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While reversal remedies misconduct with respect to the defend-
ant's rights, it does not cure the problem from a professional stand-
point. A reversal, unlike disciplinary proceedings, does not protect
the public from the unethical prosecutor. In addition, reversal
does not directly deal with the problem of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. The frequency of prosecutorial misconduct indicates that re-
versal, standing alone, has not acted as a sufficient deterrent. Thus,
something in addition to reversal is needed.
IV. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST PROSECUTORS
The first avenue of remedy might be disciplinary proceedings.
On the national level, however, it appears that there is only one
reported case in which a court imposed disciplinary sanctions
against a prosecutor for forensic misconduct.94 Indeed, it seems
that disciplinary authorities have condoned courtroom misconduct
by prosecutors. 5 The bar's reluctance to institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings against prosecutors may be unjustified in light of the fact
that attorneys other than prosecutors regularly have been called
before disciplinary tribunals for courtroom misconduct.96
94. See B. GERSHMAN, supra note 45, at § 13-6 (citing In re Maestretti, 30 Nev. 187,
191, 93 P. 1004, 1005 (Nev. 1908) (30 day suspension imposed against a prosecuting
attorney in a murder case, for criticizing, in open court, a Nevada Supreme Court deci-
sion reversing the defendant's murder conviction)); Alschuler, supra note 45, at 670-71
(same).
95. Alschuler, supra note 45, at 670 (stating that authorities have failed to discipline
prosecutors for courtroom misconduct or other forms of misconduct). It is not implied
that prosecutors never face disciplinary proceedings. See generally Annotation, Discipli-
nary Action Against Attorney for Misconduct Related to Performance of Official Duties as
Prosecuting Attorney, 10 A.L.R. 4th 605 (1981) (listing of citations to cases in which
discipline has been imposed against prosecutors). When prosecutors have been disci-
plined for misconduct other than courtroom misconduct, however, the sanctions have
been slight. See Price v. State Bar, 30 Cal. 3d 537, 638 P.2d 311, 179 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1982) (prosecutor placed on probation for five years for intentionally altering evidence in
order to place a murder defendant at the crime scene and thereafter secretly meeting with
the defendant, confessing and promising to seek leniency if the defendant kept mum); In
re McGowen, 177 Cal. 93, 170 P. 1100 (1917) (prosecutor suspended for one year for
calling a superior court judge "nothing but a crook" at a private dinner conversation,
improper conduct before a grand jury, and exerting influence to place a rape defendant on
probation in return for the defendant's payments to the victim); State v. Socolofsky, 233
Kan. 1023, 666 P.2d 727 (1983) (prosecutor censured for anonymously mailing to the
jury members whom had acquitted a defendant, a newspaper clipping depicting the ac-
quitted defendant's later plea of guilty to a misdemeanor drug charge); In re Raggio, 87
Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971) (prosecutor reprimanded for publicly criticizing a Nevada
Supreme Court opinion); Matter of Shafir, 92 N.J. 138, 455 A.2d 1114 (1983) (prosecutor
reprimanded for falsifying his superior's signature on plea bargain forms and untruthfully
representing, to another prosecutor's office, the disposition of criminal charges).
96. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (1975); In re Elam, 357 Mo.
922, 211 S.W.2d 710, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 872 (1948); Leimer v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 451,
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It should be noted, however, that the Illinois Attorney Registra-
tion and Disciplinary Commission (the "ARDC") has not been en-
tirely lax in investigating prosecutorial misconduct.97 The ARDC
appears to be aware of the problem and has undertaken steps to
cure it. The ARDC will investigate any and all allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct that comes to its attention." ARDC
representatives scrutinize the advance sheets and investigate in-
stances of prosecutorial misconduct mentioned in the cases.99 The
ARDC also investigates allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
surfacing in the media.t"° Finally, if a judge, another attorney, or a
litigant reports an occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct, the
ARDC will initiate an investigation.' 0'
Disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors for courtroom mis-
conduct might prove to be an effective solution to the problem.
Such proceedings, however, have disadvantages. First, the ARDC
already is overworked.0 2 Thus, because of the frequency of allega-
tions of prosecutorial misconduct, the ARDC simply does not pos-
sess the resources to combat prosecutorial misconduct effectively.
Second, disciplinary proceedings do not serve a punitive pur-
pose; 103 they function only to safeguard the public and maintain
the integrity of the profession.104 Hence, professional sanctions for
prosecutorial misconduct meted out under the cloak of "protecting
the public" actually may be punishing rather than protecting.
Third, although the Code of Professional Responsibility is violated
by prosecutorial misconduct, such ethical violations probably are
not the most serious of violations transpiring in this state. 05
Fourth, because prosecutors often are overworked and underpaid,
178 S.W.2d 335, cert denied, 323 U.S. 744 (1944); In re Castellano, 46 A.D. 792, 361
N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
97. For instance, the conduct described before the introduction of this article, see
supra note 1 and accompanying text, resulted in a hearing panel of the ARDC recom-
mending censure. Chicago Lawyer, August, 1987 at 14, col. 3. The Illinois Supreme
Court accepted that recommendation. Id.
98. Interview with Commissioner of the ARDC, in Chicago (Sept. 21, 1987).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
103. Alschuler, supra note 45, at 673.
104. See, e.g., In re Kesler, 89 Ill. 2d 151, 161, 433 N.E.2d 643, 648 (1982); In re
Neff, 83 111. 2d 20, 25, 413 N.E.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1980).
105. Discussion of attorney misconduct that is more serious than prosecutorial mis-
conduct is beyond the scope of this article. It cannot be said, however, that conduct such
as stealing a client's money, passing bribes and committing crimes of moral turpitude
warrants less professional discipline than a prosecutor making improper and inflam-
matory arguments in the heat of battle.
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the expense and time consumption involved in responding to disci-
plinary proceedings against prosecutors may seem unequitable.
Hence, disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors may not be the
most effective forum to remedy the problem.
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Despite the perceived inadequacies of disciplining prosecutors,
one cannot deny that the problem exists and must be rectified. The
problem of courtroom misconduct can be effectively cured in two
places - in the courtroom and in the prosecutor's office. Hence,
the following solutions are offered.
The courts repeatedly have stressed that "the trial judge has the
responsibility to maintain decorum in keeping with the nature of
the proceeding; 'the judge is not a mere moderator, but is a gover-
nor of the trial for purpose of assuring proper conduct.' " 106 Thus,
in a sense, a trial judge, remiss to preventing prosecutorial miscon-
duct, is also responsible for instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Moreover, judges can control courtroom misconduct. An edu-
cated judge who runs a tight ship simply will not tolerate a prose-
cutor misbehaving in the courtroom. Consequently, prosecutors
will not engage in deplorable antics or commit misconduct in front
of a strict judge.
More importantly, the trial judge has an arsenal of remedial
weapons to curb instances of prosecutorial misconduct. When
confronted with misconduct, the judge, sua sponte or pursuant to a
ruling on an objection, can harshly reprimand the prosecutor. A
reprimand in front of a jury would be quite effective in preventing
misconduct because a prosecutor does want to be perceived by the
jury as being at odds with the judge. In addition, the trial court
also can rely on its contempt powers to sanction prosecutorial mis-
conduct. Like disciplinary proceedings, however, courts have
rarely instituted contempt proceedings for the forensic misconduct
of a prosecutor.'7 Nonetheless, resort to contempt powers may be
a constructive alternative to formal disciplinary proceedings or the
reversal sanction. Finally, when a prosecutor commits miscon-
duct, the judge can notify disciplinary authorities. In fact, under
106. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (quoting Quercia v. U.S., 289 U.S.
466, 469 (1933)). See also People v. Lyles, 106 Il1. 2d 373, 413-14, 478 N.E.2d 291, 309
(1985); People v. Ray, 126 11. App. 3d 656, 664, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (1st Dist. 1984).
107. B. GERSHMAN, supra note 45, at § 13-6. Cf. Brutkjewicz v. State, 280 Ala. 218,
191 So.2d 222 (1966) (reversing trial court's contempt finding against a prosecutor for
courtroom misconduct).
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the new Illinois Rules of Judicial Conduct, it might be argued that
the trial judge has a duty to report instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. "o
Notwithstanding the fact that a judge can prevent prosecutorial
misconduct, he should not be confronted with such conduct in the
first place. Many of the ethical dilemmas facing the legal profes-
sion today can be solved through education. Many times, an attor-
ney who has conducted himself unethically did not initially realize
that his actions were violative of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. Absent blatant improper behavior, the same probably is
true in instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Surely, a prosecutor
does not seek reversal by making an intentionally improper argu-
ment. In a close case, however, the prosecutor may make an im-
proper argument in an effort to win. In such a case, the
prosecutor's strategy decision would pay off if the appellate court
affirms because of a failure to object, the harmless error doctrine,
or the invited response doctrine. Likewise, in a case where the evi-
dence strongly favors the state, the prosecutor can hope for affirm-
ance because of overwhelming evidence against the defendant.
In any event, a definite need to educate prosecutors on the
bounds of permissible courtroom behavior exists. It is incumbent
upon the office of the prosecutor to implement mandatory continu-
ing education programs designed to educate its attorneys about
prosecutorial misconduct. Such programs could feature lectures
by judges, veteran prosecutors, disciplinary authorities, and others
active in the field of professional responsibility. 10 9 In addition, the
education process should require prosecutors to become familiar
with various professional responsibility codes, especially the Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice. The office could also adopt an internal
policy manual, akin to the Criminal Justice Standards, providing
guidelines for proper courtroom behavior. Finally, the education
should include circulation of substantial doses of court opinions in
which prosecutorial conduct was found to be improper.
Prosecutors' offices also could invoke formal intra-office investi-
gatory and disciplinary procedures. The Office of the Cook
County States Attorney, for example, currently has no such pro-
gram.' 10 Under current procedures, when an instance of serious
108. See ILL. S. CT. R. 63(B)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 63(b)(3) (1985)
(requiring judges to report violations of the code of professional responsibility).
109. The Cook County States Attorney's Office, for example, has instituted such a
program. See Chicago Lawyer, August, 1987, at 18, cols. 2-3.
110. Id. at col. 4.
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misconduct arises and comes to the attention of a supervisor, the
case might be investigated."' In most cases, however, it appears
that the office has found the charges to be unfounded. 1 2 Obvi-
ously, because of the repeated occurrences of misconduct, the cur-
rent internal office practices of prosecutors' offices are inadequate
and a more rigid internal disciplinary structure is needed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of prosecutorial misconduct is prevalent in Illinois.
To date, the manner in which the bar and courts have treated the
problem has been ineffective from a professional standpoint. The
dilemma can be attacked effectively on three fronts: in the court-
room, in the classroom, and by instituting intra-office investigatory
and disciplinary procedures. Although suggestions in this article
may be rudimentary and require further analysis and discussion,
they do provide a starting point for pondering the problem. Hope-
fully, if the bar constructively reexamines the manner in which it
manages the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, one will read
future opinions without finding a case reversed because of a prose-
cutor's courtroom misconduct.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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